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ROBIN LE POIDEVIN 
 
A PUZZLE CONCERNING TIME PERCEPTION 
 
 
ABSTRACT. According to a plausible and influential account of perceptual knowledge, 
the truth-makers of beliefs that constitute perceptual knowledge must feature in the 
causal explanation of how we acquire those beliefs. However, this account runs into 
difficulties when it tries to accommodate time perception⎯specifically perception of 
order and duration⎯since the features we are apparently tracking in such perception are 
(it is argued) not causal. The central aim of the paper is to solve this epistemological 
puzzle. Two strategies are examined. The first strategy locates the causal truth-makers 
within the psychological mechanism underlying time perception, thus treating facts 
about time order and duration as mind-dependent. This strategy, however, is 
problematic. The second strategy modifies the causal account of perceptual knowledge 
to include a non-causal component in the explanation of belief-acquisition, namely 
chronometric explanation. Applying this much more satisfactory approach to perceptual 
knowledge of time, we can preserve the mind-independence of order and duration, but 
not that of time’s flow. 
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One might find it a difficult question, whether if there were no soul there would be time 
or not. For if it is impossible that there should be something to do the counting, it is also 
impossible that anything should be countable.... 
        Aristotle, Physics IV.4 
 
It is in my own mind, then, that I measure time. I must not allow my mind to insist that 
time is something objective. 
       Augustine, Confessions, XI.27 
 
 
1 THE PUZZLE 
 
I am looking at the clock on the mantelpiece, and note that both hands are pointing to 
twelve. Here, surely, is a straightforward case of veridical perception. There is the 
clock, and I am looking at it in near-ideal conditions. Without question, I see the clock, 
and the position of the hands, and I do so in an apparently unmediated way. Only, 
perhaps, when I entertain the thought that I might not be looking at a clock at all, but 
hallucinating, does this simple ‘direct realist’ view as to what I see when I look at 
something come into question. Assuming that I could not tell the difference between the 
case in which I genuinely see the clock and one in which I am hallucinating, we have to 
explain what the two cases have in common, and this is where the ‘indirect realist’ case 
exercises a grip on our thinking. In both cases, I see something, and that something must 
be the same in both cases (since they are qualitatively distinguishable), and since it 
cannot be the clock⎯this being entirely absent in one case⎯it must be something else, 
nearer to the mind, and this we may call a sense datum. Or so goes a familiar line of 
thought,1 and it does not impress everyone. For many, the direct realist approach is still 
an option, since we do not have to concede (they say) that what the cases of veridical 
perception and hallucination have in common is sameness of experiential object. 
 But now the clock strikes noon, and I perceive a host of other items: not merely 
a series of sounds, but one chime as following on from another, the interval between 
chimes, and that interval as remaining the same in each pair of chimes. All these are 
instances of time perception, in that the content of the perceptions seems irreducibly 
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temporal. But perceiving time in this way, and perceiving the clock, seem very different 
kinds of experience. Even if we confine our attention just to veridical time perception, 
when our senses do not deceive us as to the order or duration of events, the direct realist 
approach seems much less tempting than in the case of ordinary perception of objects. 
In fact, it is not clear that direct realism about time perception is even an option. Why is 
this? 
According to the title of a paper by the psychologist J.J. Gibson, ‘Events are 
perceivable but time is not.’2 Insofar as we think of time as something independent of 
the events within it, as an unseen, featureless medium, we could hardly fault this 
description. But whether or not time is independent of its contents, events themselves 
have temporal features: they occur in a certain order, and they last for a certain amount 
of time. And if we were completely insensitive to these features, then it would be a 
mystery how we come to be aware of motion, interpret Morse code, or appreciate 
music. 
However, it is one thing to form beliefs about order and duration on the basis of 
our perceptions, and quite another actually to perceive order and duration. If the 
meaning of Gibson’s dictum is that, although we may come to be aware of the temporal 
features of events, those features are never themselves the objects of our perceptual 
states, then a number of considerations tell in its favour. 
First, there is no specific organ for the time sense. Whereas light is registered by 
the visual system, and sounds by the auditory system, there is no anatomically 
identifiable system for time awareness. It is true of course that perception of shape is 
cross-modal: we are aware of it in both vision and touch (and bats perceive it in terms 
of variation of high-frequency sounds), and yet there is no obvious objection to the 
direct realist perception of shape. But there is a relatively straightforward story to be 
told about the way in which the shape of, say an apple, can be an object of perception 
when the apple is (although the details of the story may be complicated): the shape of 
the apple modifies the distribution and properties of light rays reflected from its surface 
and which then hit the retina; it also modifies both the distribution of pressure exerted 
by the apple on our touch receptors, and the kinaesthetic input as we close our hands 
around it. With time, in contrast, it does not make sense to suppose that, when a given 
event such as the ringing of the telephone is perceived, the duration of that event, or its 
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occurring after some other event, somehow modifies the input, allowing us just to hear 
its duration and position vis-à-vis other events. We are only aware of how long an event 
lasted when it has receded into our phenomenal past⎯when, in other words, the event 
has ceased to be an object of perception.  
 Second, perception has temporal limits. What we perceive, we perceive as 
present, as happening now. But from this commonplace it seems to follow that a 
currently perceived event, or rather that bit of it that is being perceived, cannot be 
divided into apparently earlier or later parts. Of course, the item perceived will in fact 
have earlier and later parts, for only something that lasts for more than a certain 
duration will be perceived at all. But if something is perceived as present, then it cannot 
be perceived as having earlier and later parts. This lack of temporal discrimination for 
sufficiently short stimuli defines what is often called, in a phrase coined by E.R. Clay 
but made famous by William James, the ‘specious present’. The experienced present is 
‘specious’ in that it is not the durationless boundary between past and future, but rather 
something that takes up time.3 But if what is perceived is perceived as happening now, 
then there is no room for the perception of time order, for that would involve perception 
of things as non-simultaneous, whereas two events that are perceived as happening now 
are, necessarily, perceived as simultaneous. What of duration? A similar problem 
presents itself here. To perceive an event as lasting a certain period of time, we have to 
perceive it as having earlier and later parts. But of course, these parts cannot all be 
perceived as happening now, for then they would be perceived as simultaneous. So 
duration is not something that can be an object of perception.  
Third, whereas it is possible to be aware just of the colour of an object⎯I can 
focus on its redness, say, to the exclusion of all else⎯it is not possible to be aware just 
of the relation of temporal subsequence when it obtains between two events. To see one 
event as following on from another, I have to be aware of the events themselves. The 
relation by itself cannot be an object of perception as colour by itself can. Similarly with 
duration: I cannot be aware just of the duration of an event. Somehow, the awareness of 
order and duration emerges from a perception of the events. 
So, on the one hand, our perceptions inform us of the order and duration of 
events. Moreover, the process appears to be a non-inferential one: we can become aware 
of temporal features without having consciously to derive them from other information. 
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But, on the other hand, the usual models for ordinary perception, of shape and colour 
for example, are not applicable to time. In particular, order and duration are not objects 
of perceptual states. What then are the mechanisms underlying our perceptual 
awareness of time order and duration? This is the psychological problem of time 
perception. Here is one psychologist’s perspective on the problem: 
 
There is no process in the external world which directly gives rise to time experience, nor 
is there anything immediately discernible outside ourselves which can apprehend any 
special ‘time stimuli’. It is therefore not too surprising that psychological research on 
time as a dimension of consciousness has been so diverse, so incoherent, and so easily 
forgotten. (Ornstein (1972), p. 96.)4 
 
Of course, a psychological problem requires a psychological answer, not a 
philosophical one. But there is a philosophical dimension to the issue, one concerning 
the epistemological status of our perceptual awareness of the temporal features of the 
environment. If we can take it as a datum that we can form, on the basis of our 
perceptions (by some mechanism yet to be determined), beliefs concerning both time 
order and duration, we can also take it as a datum that these beliefs are at least capable 
of being, and generally are, a form of perceptual knowledge⎯although of course we 
often make mistakes. Now, according to an influential and plausible theory of 
perceptual knowledge, the truth-makers of those beliefs should occur in the causal 
history behind our acquisition of them.5 But one moral of the disanalogies we were 
drawing attention to above between ordinary perception and time perception is that time 
order and duration are not features of events that cause our perceptual states. And if 
they are not the causes of our perceptual states, then it is hard to see how they could be 
the causes of beliefs that arise from those perceptual states. This suggestion, that order 
and duration do not play a causal role, will be confirmed when we come to look at 
models of time perception. It is a problem, then, to explain, compatibly with the causal 
theory of perceptual knowledge, how time perception can lead to knowledge of the 
temporal features of the environment. This is the epistemological puzzle of time 
perception. Solving this puzzle is the aim of this paper. 
 Making things a little more explicit, the puzzle arises from the following 
conjunction of plausible and defensible propositions: 
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The causal truth-maker principle:  Perceptual beliefs that qualify for the title 
‘knowledge’ are caused by their truth-makers. 
 
The acausality of order and duration: The objective order and duration of events 
are not the causes of our perceptual beliefs concerning order and duration. 
 
Together, these two appear to imply that, even if there is such a thing as time 
perception, it cannot count as knowledge, since the truth makers of our beliefs in these 
cases play no role in the causal history of those beliefs. (To derive this result formally, 
we have of course to add what may seem the rather obvious proposition that actual 
order and duration, or facts concerning them, are the truth-makers of perceptual beliefs 
about order and duration.) 
 Plausible though they may be, something needs to be said in defence of the two 
propositions, especially in view of their implication. First, the causal theory of 
perceptual knowledge, of which the causal truth-maker principle is a component, may 
be vulnerable on other grounds. Second, the acausality of order and duration may seem 
too strong a lesson to draw from the disanalogies between time perception and 
perception of shape or colour. The next section, then, is concerned with a defence of the 
component propositions of the puzzle. The section following introduces two plausible 
models of time perception. My concern is less to establish their correctness as to show 
how, if correct, they confirm the acausality principle. We then turn, in §4, to an 
Augustinian resolution of the puzzle, one that treats time, or at least certain aspects of it, 
as mind-dependent. This resolution turns out to be problematic, and in §5, I shall argue 
for a rather different approach. The moral of the story is twofold: first, that we need to 
modify the causal theory of knowledge if it is to apply quite generally to perceptual 
belief; second, that a proper understanding of the way in which our perceptual beliefs 
concerning temporal properties are both explained and made true may teach us some 
important truths about the nature of time.  
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2 COMPONENTS OF THE PUZZLE 
 
2.1 The causal truth-maker principle 
 
The causal truth-maker principle (hereafter CTMP) is appealing, first because 
perception is evidently a causal process, and second because it successfully 
discriminates in very simple terms, and in a wide range of cases, true beliefs that 
constitute knowledge from those that do not. For example, I see someone I take to be 
Julian, riding a trishaw down the street. I form the belief that Julian is riding a trishaw, 
and I happen to be right about that: Julian is indeed riding a trishaw at the very moment 
I form my belief, but the person I saw was his brother, Ivan. Here, the truth-maker was 
not among the causes of my belief, which therefore fails to count as genuine knowledge. 
And so we can go on multiplying the examples. However, there are some trickier cases 
where knowledge, or the lack of it, is not so easily captured. They fall into two groups: 
those that call into doubt the sufficiency of the causal link with truth-makers to confer 
the status of knowledge on a belief, and those that call into doubt its necessity. Strictly, 
only the latter directly threaten the CTMP. However, the CTMP gains some of its 
plausibility by being part of a wider causal theory of knowledge. If that theory is 
vulnerable to objections, the CTMP loses some of that plausibility, even if the 
objections do not strictly conflict with its truth. It is not my intention in this paper to 
defend a fully worked-out causal theory of knowledge, but I need to show the 
possibility of expanding the CTMP so as to provide a plausible theory of perceptual 
knowledge.   
 Here, then, are the kinds of case that cause difficulties for the causal theory: 
 
(a) Against the sufficiency of the causal link with truth-makers 
 
(i) Unreliable causes. I am looking at a series of photographic slides that are being 
projected onto a screen. Unknown to me, some of the slides have been placed in the 
projector the wrong way around, so the screen image in these cases is left-right inverted 
relative to the original subject. I am currently looking a slide of, say, a street, and so 
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form beliefs concerning the relative positions of the buildings, etc. Since this slide has 
not been inverted, my beliefs are true, and they are caused (ultimately) by their truth-
makers, but they do not count as knowledge. 
(ii) The presence of relevant perceptual equivalents. I am looking at a scene through a 
window. Unknown to me, the scene has been reflected by a series of mirrors, in such a 
way, however, that the apparent spatial relations between me and the various objects in 
the scene exactly matches their actual spatial relations. Again, although the truth-makers 
and the causes of my beliefs coincide, those beliefs do not count as knowledge.6 
(iii) Deviant causal chains. I believe that there is a dagger in front of me on the basis of 
a visual experience that is caused by a state of affairs precisely matching my belief, but 
via a ‘deviant’ causal chain. E.g. my experience is caused directly by stimulation of my 
brain by electrical impulses delivered by a machine operated by a scientist whose 
intention it is artificially to replicate experiences the kind of which I would be having 
were I actually perceiving the dagger that is in fact in front of me.7  I believe, but do not 
know, that there is a dagger in front of me. 
 
(b) Against the necessity of the causal link with truth-makers 
 
(iv) Beliefs with conventional conceptual content. I see a tree, and, having some arborial 
expertise, form the (correct) belief that it is an Ilex oak. I can be said, in fact, to know 
that this is an Ilex oak. The truth-maker of the belief has to do with a conventional 
system of classification, however, whereas the causes of the belief are simply to do with 
the intrinsic properties of the tree. 
(iv) Demonstrative thoughts. I think, looking at the girl who has just walked into the 
café, ‘That’s Monica’. Since the person I am looking at is Monica, the truth-maker of 
my belief is that Monica = Monica. But this fact is a necessary one, and so cannot be the 
cause of my belief. (On the grounds that causal relations entail counterfactual relations, 
and counterfactual relations can only obtain between contingently existing facts.) My 
belief can nevertheless be classed as genuine knowledge. 
 
The first case can be dealt with by appeals to reliability. The process by which I form 
beliefs⎯looking at slides that may or may not be inverted⎯is simply not a reliable one. 
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The example shows that whereas there are many cases where reliability can be cashed 
out simply in terms of a causal link with the truth-maker, there are others where this is 
not enough. Reference must be made to the tendency of the belief-generating process to 
produce true beliefs, or (to put it another way) to the high probability that the process 
will generate beliefs via their truth-makers. A similar proposal recommends itself in the 
second case. Actually, it is not clear that the mere presence of the mirrors (and my 
ignorance of them) undermines the epistemic status of the belief. Only perhaps if the 
mirrors were regularly moved around in such a way that it is just a matter of luck 
whether what is presented corresponds to the scene or not would we want to deny that I 
know, on the basis of my perceptions, where things are. But then the second case is just 
a variant of the first.  
The third case does introduce a new element, that of the deviant causal chain, 
which plagues causal theories of perception, memory and action. In the case described, 
the deviancy of the chain undermines the experience’s claim to be a genuine perception 
of the dagger. But is this a problem of knowledge? It may be possible to gain 
knowledge of the dagger by means of a visual or apparently visual experience, even if 
one cannot be said to be perceiving the dagger. And perhaps the criterion we use in 
deciding whether we have knowledge in this case will depend on the reliability of the 
process by which we come to have the belief, so that, once again, the case can be 
assimilated to the first. However, this may not go quite far enough. The fact remains 
that I mistake the immediate cause of my experience. I am not, as it turns out, really 
seeing the dagger. So how can I know that there is a dagger in front of me? But, if this 
is so, then it suggests that reliability is not enough. The causal chain leading to a belief 
may be both reliable (in that the belief thus caused has a high probability of being true) 
and yet deviant. So what distinguishes the deviant case from the non-deviant case in 
such a way that explains how non-deviant chains can lead to genuine knowledge? One 
proposal is to introduce the notion of higher-order reliability. A process may be 
reliable, as in the case of the honest scientist stimulating my brain, and yet not itself 
have been generated by a reliable process. In the case of ordinary perception, it is not 
only reliable, it also exhibits higher-order reliability: our perceptual systems have 
evolved through a process of natural selection which itself makes it highly likely that 
perceptual systems will be reliable. Deviant cases, arguably, do not exhibit this higher-
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order reliability. The possibility remains, perhaps, of a causal chain whose deviant 
nature prevents the result from being classified as a genuine perception, even though the 
process leading to the apparently perceptual belief exhibits higher-order reliability. In 
this case, I would be tempted to say, we have knowledge but not perception. Deviancy 
per se need not be a threat to knowledge, as it is to perception, memory and intentional 
action. 
Now let us turn to the alleged counterexamples to the necessity of a causal link 
between truth-maker and belief. Consider the Ilex oak. Is this really a problem? All 
perceptual beliefs, let us concede, will have some conceptual content (assuming that 
they have a propositional structure; it may be that there are some perceptions lacking 
that structure that do not possess conceptual content, but that is not the issue here since 
we are concerned only with perceptual beliefs). Those concepts will have their origins 
beyond the experience they help to structure. Does that matter? Given the admittedly 
conventional system of classification, all that is needed for my belief that this is an Ilex 
oak to be true are the intrinsic properties of the tree. And given that I possess the 
relevant concepts, and am suitably oriented vis-à-vis the tree, those same intrinsic 
properties will be sufficient to cause that belief. 
In the case of the demonstrative thought, the obvious reply here is to deny that 
the truth-maker in question is Monica = Monica. There are, in any case, other grounds 
to question that Monica = Monica is the truth-maker, for the necessity of the truth-
maker would appear to confer necessity onto the belief it makes true, yet ‘That’s 
Monica’, being clearly empirical, does not look like a necessary truth. There are a 
number of candidates for the role of truth-maker for demonstrative thought, but one that 
would satisfy the contingency constraint relates perceiver and object: my thought is true 
because the person who stands in the appropriate perceptual relation to me is Monica. 
The causal theory of perceptual knowledge, it seems, is robust enough to deal 
with a number of apparent counterexamples. So the first proposition of our problematic 
pair will be hard to abandon. Let us now look at the second proposition. 
 
 
10 
 
 
 
 
 
2.2 The acausality of order and duration 
 
It was suggested in §1 that, since order and duration are not the objects of perceptual 
states, they are not the causes of those states. This is not, in general, a safe inference. 
There are any number of hidden causes of our perceptual states, to do for example with 
the underlying psychological or physiological mechanisms of perception, which are 
never the objects of those states. But we are concerned with external features of the 
world, and it is hard to see how they can causally impinge on us if we never perceive 
them. But, in any case, there are other reasons for thinking that order and duration may 
not be the sort of features that are capable of entering into causal relations.8 I offer here, 
not a knock-down argument to the effect that they cannot possibly causally affect 
things, but rather some awkward questions for anyone who thinks that they do. 
 What, first, is a cause? Or rather, what kinds of things are causal relata? Here is 
Davidson on the question: 
 
Much of what philosophers have said of causes and causal relations is intelligible only on 
the assumption (often enough explicit) that causes are individual events, and causal 
relations hold between events. (Davidson (1967), 161.) 
 
But if only events are causes, then order and duration cannot be causes, since order and 
duration are features of events, not themselves events. There is no event of the Great 
Plague’s standing in the ‘earlier than’ relation to the Great Fire of London.  
 What then if we allow properties as causes? This seems plausible enough: the 
weight of the flour causes the needle of the scales to point to 4 oz. Order, however, is a 
relational property, as is duration (an event lasts five minutes if its final boundary is five 
minutes later than its initial boundary). Can relations be causes? In a well-known 
discussion of the existence of universals in The Problems of Philosophy, Russell makes 
the following observation: 
 
Consider such a proposition as ‘Edinburgh is north of London’. Here we have a relation 
between two places, and it seems plain that the relation subsists independently of our 
knowledge of it.…… 
….however…the relation ‘north of’ does not seem to exist in the same sense in which 
11 
 
 
 
 
 
Edinburgh and London exist. If we ask ‘Where and when does this relation exist?’ the 
answer must be ‘Nowhere and nowhen’. There is no place or time where we can find the 
relation ‘north of’. ….Now everything that can be apprehended by the senses or by 
introspection exists at some particular time. Hence the relation ‘north of’ is radically 
different from such things. (Russell (1912), 56.) 
 
If this correctly characterises ‘north of’, it also characterises ‘later than’. And, since 
duration is also a relational property, Russell’s observation would apply to that too. But 
now causes are items that have locations, both in space and time. Their having those 
locations is what helps to explain why they have their effects at the times and in the 
places they do. But if order and duration relations do not have locations, they are 
acausal. 
However, as he makes clear, Russell takes the ‘north of’ relation to be a 
universal, and therefore something that other places can stand in to each other. What if 
instead we concern ourselves with the trope, the token of the type, this very instance of 
‘north of’, relating Edinburgh and London? What is its location? We still face 
difficulties in arriving at anything other than an ad hoc answer to the question. There 
seems no good reason to locate the relation just in Edinburgh, or just in London. 
Perhaps, then, it is located in the region between Edinburgh and London. But how do 
we define this region? Is it just the straight line connecting the two? Is it the whole of 
United Kingdom? Should it not include the North Pole? Is it the surface of the Earth? 
Even if we are dealing with the trope rather than the universal, perhaps the best thing to 
say is that the relation is nowhere: it does not have a spatial location at all. The same 
worries arise for order and duration. There is a clap of thunder at 4 o’clock, and the rain 
starts pouring down at one minute past 4. These events are readily locatable. But what 
of the temporal relation between them? That relation, even if we treat it as a trope, is not 
readily locatable at 4, nor one minute past, nor any time in between. And what of the 
rainstorm’s property of lasting 20 minutes? Where is that in time? Again, we may be 
tempted to say that these properties have no temporal location: they exist timelessly. 
But if they are timeless, they cannot be causes. If we insist that these relational 
properties do have a location, only that are somehow spread out in a spatio-temporal 
region that includes the relata, and that is how those properties can be causes, we are 
still faced with the question: why, if they are spread out in space and time, are they not 
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capable of having effects in all parts of that region? Whether or not some ‘earlier than’ 
trope is the cause of my belief that the thunderclap preceded the rain, it cannot possibly 
cause my belief before I experience the rain. But then why not, if it exists before the 
rain does? 
We might instead take causal relata to be facts, of which events and their 
properties are constituents. Indeed, given the argument that the truth-making role cannot 
be occupied by objects, events or properties, but only by structured combinations of 
them, namely facts,9 it would seem that the CTMP may be committed to facts as causes. 
But this does nothing to relieve the worries expressed above concerning the location of 
tropes, since they also arise for facts about order and duration. 
Some further worries, not to do with location: are there in fact any cases where 
we cannot explain away the apparent causal efficacy of temporal properties? Take the 
case of the egg’s being cooked because it has been boiled for 5 minutes. What is doing 
the causing here? The mere passage of time? No: the egg is cooked because of the 
individual events that took place during those five minutes. Or take a machine that 
produces one output, C, if the two kinds of input, A and B, occur in the order AB, and 
another output, D, if they occur in the order BA. Is the mere order of the inputs itself a 
cause? Or is the correct story rather something like the following: given an initial state 
of the machine, S1, the effect of input A is to change the machine’s state to S2. And 
when the machine is in S2, the effect of input B is the production of output C. But when 
the machine is in S1, the effect of input B is to change the machine’s state to S3, and the 
effect then of input A is not to change the machine state to S2, but rather the production 
of output D. On this account, it is not the mere order of inputs that determines the 
output, but what state the machine is in when it receives a given input. Now, if we are to 
take seriously the suggestion that order and duration per se can be causes, then there 
have to be cases where the natural form of explanation that applies in these cases of the 
egg and the machine is just not available. And this, intuitively, seems odd. 
 These are just expressions of puzzlement of course. But given that treating order 
and duration as causal is problematic in one way or another, it would be best not to give 
those properties a causal role in our account of how we acquire order and duration 
beliefs. And so we come back to the epistemological puzzle. In trying to solve it, it 
would help if we had some insight into the psychological mechanisms of time 
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perception. It should not be necessary to have at our disposal a detailed description of 
this undoubtedly complex process. Since the puzzle we face is one that is raised at a 
high level of abstraction, it should be enough to show that some plausible abstract 
description of how we acquire beliefs concerning order and duration through perception 
of events can be reconciled with epistemological requirements. 
  
  
3 THE PSYCHOLOGICAL BASIS OF TIME PERCEPTION 
 
It was argued in §1 that perception of precedence and duration cannot be confined to the 
‘specious present’, as such perception would require discrimination between earlier and 
later events, or earlier and later parts of the same event. In explaining how our 
perceptions can give raise to an impression of temporal properties we have to appeal, 
therefore, to the operation of short-term memory. In the case of simple precedence, the 
mechanism might well be something like this: stimulus a is perceived, and its 
occurrence registered in the short-term memory. Stimulus b is subsequently perceived, 
and the representation of a in the short-term memory causes b to be represented as 
occurring after a. Perception of precedence therefore is not simply a matter of one 
perception preceding another, but that earlier perception causally affecting the later one 
(Mellor (1995), (1998)). 
 If we can allow simple introspection here as judge, this account seems very 
plausible. Perceptions do seem to be coloured by immediately preceding ones. 
However, there are two problems for this as a general account of the awareness of 
precedence. The first is that there are cases we can be aware that two perceived events 
are not simultaneous without being able to say which one came first (Hirsh and Sherrick 
(1961)). If there is any causal connection between perceptions in this case, it is 
evidently not sufficient to determine perceived order. The second is raised by instances 
of ‘backwards time referral’, where the perceived order of two stimuli, as reported by 
the subject, is the reverse of the order of the perceptions. These, and related cases, seem 
to require a rather different mechanism underlying order perception. The causal model 
above makes order perception sensitive to the time order of perceptions, but insensitive 
to its content. One might, however, consider an alternative model: order perception is 
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content-sensitive, but time-insensitive. That is, the perceived order may depend on the 
brain’s decision as to what ordering best ‘makes sense’, given what the perceptions are 
of. 10 
However, these may not be serious objections to the causal model. In both non-
simultaneity-without-order perception and backwards time referral, the events occur 
very close to each other in time, and different mechanisms may then come into play. 
Where there is a significant gap between perceptions, the suggestion that order 
perception could be time-insensitive becomes less plausible. The causal model might 
still be appropriate for standard cases. As far as the first kind of case is concerned, even 
if the mechanism for non-simultaneity perception is also a component of the more 
complex mechanism underlying awareness of time order, it may still be the causal order 
of perceptions that accounts for the perceived asymmetry. In the case of backwards time 
referral, it is a contentious matter when precisely a perception occurred vis-à-vis 
another. 
 When it comes to perception of duration, whether of a single stimulus or of the 
interval between stimuli, the mechanism must be more complex. The considerations of 
§2 lead us to suppose that duration is not the kind of thing that can impinge on us 
directly. So how do we become aware of it? The answer appears to be that we 
‘perceive’ the duration of an event by mimicing it. There is now a considerable amount 
of evidence supporting the suggestion that organisms sensitive to time have internal 
time-keepers, or ‘biological clocks’. Given the huge variety of time-sensitive behaviour 
in animals, including hibernation, circadian sleep cycles, and locomotive control, it 
seems likely that there is more than one biological clock governing behaviour. 
Concentrating on the kinds of case that require fine temporal discriminations, the basic 
mechanism proposed by scalar timing theory involves a neural pacemaker, emitting 
regular pulses, and an accumulator, which records the number of pulses emitted by the 
pacemaker for a given period. Perception of the duration of a given stimulus, according 
to this theory, involves the following mechanism. Onset of the stimulus causes a switch 
connecting the pacemaker and accumulator to close. The accumulator then records 
pulses until the cessation of the stimulus causes the switch to open, breaking the 
connection. The accumulator’s record may then lead to a judgement of duration, or can 
be stored in the memory for comparison with other stimuli (Gibbon, Church and Meck, 
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1984.) In one variant of the model, the pacemaker produces pulses at intervals that are 
variable but whose average duration is nevertheless constant.  
 
Switch 
Stimulus onset: 
closed 
Stimulus offset: 
open 
Comparator 
Long-Term 
Memory 
Short-Term 
Memory 
Accumulator Pacemaker 
 
 
 
 
Fig 1: The scalar timing theory of duration perception 
 
 
Appeal to the slowing down or speeding up of the rate at which the pacemaker emits 
pulses provides a simple explanation of the familiar fact that time seems to go faster in 
some contexts and more slowly in others. In some cases, the pacemaker appears to be 
very seriously altered, with potentially disastrous results. One of the most dramatic 
instances of this is the Zeitrafferphänomen or accelerated time phenomenon. In one 
case, a patient who had suffered damage to the left prefrontal cortex was driving his car 
when he suddenly found that objects outside appeared to be rushing towards him at an 
accelerated rate. Watching television was virtually impossible because events on the 
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screen were happening too fast to make sense of (Binkofski and Block, 1996). One 
explanation of his experiences is that the damage to the left hemisphere had caused the 
pacemaker to slow down its production of pulses. In non-pathological cases, the 
pacemaker pulse rate appears to be affected, or ‘entrained’, by external stimuli such as a 
series of high-frequency clicks (Treisman (1999)). It is a very plausible suggestion that 
the pacemaker may also be affected by drugs, since these produce marked distortions of 
time estimates (Friedman (1990). 
 An alternative model for timing involves, not a single pacemaker, but a series of 
oscillators, whose cycles differ from each other but nevertheless have well-defined 
phases. Instead of an accumulator recording number of pulses is some mechanism that 
detects, at any one time, what phase each oscillator is in. Thus time from the onset of a 
stimulus may be represented qualitatively, rather than quantitatively, by the 
permutations of phases (Church and Broadbent, 1990). 
 The precise details of the mechanism do not matter in the context of addressing 
our epistemological puzzle. What does matter is the key idea underlying all these 
models, that of a regular (or averagely regular) neurophysiological process that is 
effectively a clock system. Thus the perception of time is not simply a passive reception 
of external stimuli, but an active structuring of stimuli based on an internal system of 
measurement: 
 
The ear and eye respond to energies from the environment that impinge upon their 
receptive surfaces. The tongue and nose sample molecules. To orient us in space, the 
vestibular system depends on properties the body possesses as a physical object (its 
response to gravity and inertia). It would seem that the time sense relies on properties of 
the brain itself as a physical system, the propensity of neurons or neural networks to 
produce oscillations that can be used as timing devices. Thus one function of the brain 
may be to act as the sense organ for time. (Treisman, 1999, p. 244.) 
 
Controversial though they may be, the models of time perception briefly presented 
in this section at least give us a starting point in our approach to the epistemological 
puzzle. What is interesting about these models is that they confirm our suspicion that 
order and duration do not play a causal role, for on neither model were these temporal 
properties appealed to as causes of our perceptual states. The challenge, then, is to show 
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how, if time perception is based on something like the mechanisms described by these 
models, it can lead to knowledge of the temporal properties of events. Since there is a 
tension between the CTMP and the acausality of order and duration, any resolution of it 
must pursue one of two strategies: revise our view of what makes perceptual beliefs 
about intervals true, or revise the causal account of perceptual knowledge. In the 
remainder of this paper, I shall look at both strategies. 
 
 
 
4 FIRST ATTEMPT TO DISSOLVE THE PUZZLE: 
ORDER AND DURATION AS MIND-DEPENDENT 
 
 
4.1 An Augustinian inference 
 
The problem of accounting for time perception greatly exercised Augustine, and it led 
him ultimately to his extraordinary conclusion that time was all in the mind. Here was 
the initial difficulty:  
 
But to what period do we relate time when we measure it as it is passing? To the future, 
from which it comes? No: because we cannot measure what does not exist. To the 
present, through which it is passing? No: because we cannot measure what has no 
duration.To the past, then, towards which it is going? No again: because we cannot 
measure what no longer exists. (Augustine (1961), p. 270.) 
 
What, then, are we measuring? Augustine’s answer is that it is mental item: ‘It is in my 
own mind, then, that I measure time.’ An answer, we might note, that has clear parallels 
with the sense datum theory of perception. What he infers from it, however, is quite 
surprising: that the object of my measurement is a mental item, and since time belongs 
only to such objects, time itself is purely mental.11 
 Now, we might query Augustine’s apparent failure to distinguish the direct 
object of measurement (a mental item) from the indirect object (the external event). But 
our epistemological puzzle provides us with a motivation, not unrelated to Augustine’s 
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concerns, for his conclusion that time is mind-dependent. We can, as it were, update 
Augustine’s argument using the components of our puzzle. So far, we have argued that 
the putatively mind-independent facts concerning time order and duration are not the 
causes, direct or indirect, of our corresponding perceptual beliefs. But the CTMP 
requires that the truth-makers of those perceptual beliefs that constitute knowledge be 
part of the causal chain leading to those beliefs. Now, although the items whose 
temporal relations we seem to perceive may be external items (two chimes of the clock, 
a flash of lightning and clap of thunder, the beginning and end of a musical phrase), the 
causes that are responsible specifically for the perception of order and duration are 
within the mind. So, the neo-Augustinian argument goes, we should look for the truth-
makers of the relevant beliefs amongst the psychological facts. This would imply, of 
course, that time order and duration are mind-dependent. 
 The models of time perception we looked at in the previous section pave the 
way to this approach. The scalar timing theory, for instance, suggests a representative 
theory of perception, where the immediate object of perception is some mental 
representation of an external state. The mind-dependence strategy simply disposes of 
the external state (the duration of the event), leaving us just with the representation.   
 Let us now look in more detail at what this strategy involves⎯and whether it 
works. 
 
 
4.2 Prospects for a psychological analysis of time order 
 
Our judgements concerning the temporal order of events depend in part on our spatial 
relations to those events. On the castle battlements, a cannon is fired to mark the hour of 
noon. Simultaneously, half a mile away, the town church begins to strike. People 
walking around the castle walls will hear first the noonday gun, and then the church 
bell. Those about to enter the church will hear first the bell’s initial strike, and then the 
gun’s report. Judgements based solely on observation and in ignorance of one’s location 
vis-à-vis the observed events are therefore prone to error. We can capture this in terms 
of what I shall call the objectivity constraint: judgements concerning time order are 
objectively true or false; they are not simply a matter of opinion, so disagreements 
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between observers are genuine. Any theory of time order must either conform to the 
objectivity constraint, or give us a compelling reason to abandon it. Can the suggestion 
that time order is mind-dependent be reconciled with the objectivity constraint? 
 At first sight, it might seem that objectivity automatically rules out mind-
dependence, but this in general is not so. Consider the case of spatially indexical beliefs, 
such as ‘The centre of the magnetic field is here’. This can be given perfectly objective 
truth-conditions, as follows: any utterance or thought, u, of that type, is true iff and only 
if u is located at the centre of the magnetic field. Whether or not those truth-conditions 
obtain is not a matter of subjective opinion. However, the ‘hereness’ picked out by such 
a token is still mind-dependent, in that it is not an intrinsic property of the external 
space, but rather a relation between that space and a representation of it. There would 
be no sense to the suggestion that, even in the absence of minds, some place would still 
be uniquely and absolutely here. The truth-conditions for ‘here’-judgements can both be 
mind-dependent and reflect the perspectival nature of such judgements. Any application 
of the objectivity constraint, therefore, does not automatically and question-beggingly 
imply mind-independence. Objectivity and mind-dependence are both exhibited by 
perspectival judgements. 
 If we represent judgements of time order as similarly perspectival, then we 
effectively identify actual order with perceived order. To retain objectivity, we have to 
build in the actual spatial relations between observers and events. Thus, the castle 
visitors’ judgement that the gun went off before the church bell struck was objectively 
true given their location, and the church visitors’ judgement that the bell struck before 
the gun went off was objectively true given their location. Only someone equidistant 
from castle and church could correctly judge that the two events were simultaneous.  
A consequence, however, of this perspectival treatment of order is that, as it stands, it 
implies that there cannot be relations of precedence among unperceived events. If this 
seems too strong, then we could consider the following compromise: we should 
distinguish between the relation of precedence, on which the direction of time depends, 
and the relation of temporal betweenness, which by itself does not give time its 
direction. We can treat the former as mind-dependent without treating the latter 
similarly. So, if we assume that temporal betweenness is independent of psychological 
facts, all that is required to give direction to the whole time series is the relevant 
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psychological relation between some facts in the series. Take the following, as yet 
undirected, series of events, ordered by the relation of temporal betweenness: 
 
e1⎯e2⎯e3⎯e4⎯e5⎯e6⎯e7 
 
Now suppose only e4 and e6 in this series are perceived, by some observer O, and e6 is 
perceived as occurring after e4. Then, given that e5 is between e4 and e6, and e4 is 
between e3 and e5, it follows that, relative to O, e3 is earlier than e5, although neither is 
perceived. Since time order is supposed on this model to be perspectival, however, the 
possibility remains that e6 will be perceived by some other observer as preceding e4, and 
this would mean that the entire series would have a different direction for this observer. 
We do not need to concern ourselves with this consequence, however, since we cannot 
make precedence perpectival without making betweenness similarly perspectival, so 
this compromise is not an option. We can imagine two observers so situated that for one 
of them three spatially separated events occur in the order ABC, while for the other they 
occur in the order BAC. Unless betweenness is perspectival, one of these observers is 
wrong, thus upsetting the perspectival account of precedence. 
 Whether or not such a perspectival account is viable, however, it does not help 
us solve the epistemological puzzle. For it locates the truth-makers of time order 
judgements, not wholly in the mind, but in the relations between external events and 
observers. And if we try to represent these relations, or facts concerning them, as the 
causes of our perceptual beliefs, then we face the problems raised in §2.2, and little 
would have been gained by pursuing the mind-dependence strategy. On the other hand, 
if we treat the truth-makers of order judgements as wholly internal to the mind, then we 
may have restored their causal status, but at the expense of giving up the objectivity 
constraint. Is there a compelling argument for doing this? Well, that it disposes of the 
epistemological puzzle is an argument, but its force depends on the CTMP having a 
stronger hold on us than the objectivity constraint, and on the absence of any other 
plausible solution to the puzzle.  
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4.3 Conventionalism about metric 
 
Intuition may favour the objectivity constraint in the case of time order, but it is perhaps 
somewhat less strongly in favour of objectivity when it comes to duration. Are there 
objective facts of the matter as to the metric of time? Consider, for example, two 
successive swings of a pendulum: did the second swing take exactly as long as the first? 
Objectivism about temporal metric says that there is a fact of the matter as to whether it 
did or did not, independently of any means we have of establishing the fact. 
Conventionalism about metric denies this. The truth or falsity of what we might call 
judgements of isochrony (that two intervals are of the same duration) depends on which 
clock we adopt as our standard. As Reichenbach articulates it, ‘The equality of 
successive time intervals is not a matter of knowledge but a matter of definition......All 
definitions are equally admissible’ (Reichenbach (1958), p. 116). 
 Since the assumption that there are objective facts about metric is a central 
aspect of our puzzle, conventionalism appears to offer a way out of the difficulty. The 
human brain (indeed, in many cases, the animal brain) is, according to well-confirmed 
psychological models, a clock system, and so provides one possible definition of 
isochrony. If so, then the conventional, clock-relative truth-conditions of perceptual 
judgements of isochrony will obtain simply by virtue of the psychological processes 
leading to those judgements. Cause and truth-maker will coincide. 
 Or will they? Reichenbach says that all definitions of isochrony are equally 
admissable. This appears to follow from the conventionalist assertion that no system by 
which we measure intervals of time is objectively more accurate than any other, since 
accuracy is defined in terms of one’s choice of system. But Reichenbach’s position 
seems unduly liberal. William Newton-Smith suggests that, even for the 
conventionalist, some judgements about isochrony are not merely eccentric, but false. 
There are some constraints on selecting a standard: ‘if I adopt some deviant clock which 
gives the ice age, the time between my last two heartbeats and a performance of 
Wagner’s Ring the same duration, I am just wrong.’ (Newton-Smith (1980), p. 163.) 
Our standard should be what we could call a reasonable clock system (RCS), but how, 
without invoking objective metric, do we determine what counts as an RCS? One 
criterion of an RCS would be that it be reproducible, such that different instances of the 
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system tend to remain approximately congruent with each other, and occasional failures 
of congruence would be readily explicable by means of a simple theory, allowing one to 
correct errant instances. In addition, the clock system should be compatible with the 
construction of a coherent physical theory (e.g. of motion). So, having thus defined 
what it is to be an RCS, the conventionalist can say that judgements of isochrony are 
true relative to some RCS. The crucial question is then whether the human brain 
constitutes an RCS or not. If not, then conventionalism can only offer an escape route 
from our puzzle if we adopt Reichenbach’s liberal approach. As a time-measurement 
system, our biological clock is notoriously variable, and affected by such things as 
temperature, excitement and boredom, and of course drugs. Nevertheless, it is a more 
satisfactory clock system than some systems we might choose as the standard: were it 
not so, we would be unable to co-ordinate bodily movements as well as we do, nor 
detect subtle variations in the motion of external objects, nor be able to appreciate and 
produce music. Let us not be too particular, then, and designate our biological clock an 
RCS. 
 Consider, then, the perception of two successive stimuli by an observer who 
judges on the basis of their perception that the first stimulus was shorter in duration than 
the second. The truth of this judgement, according to the conventionalist, is relative to 
the choice of RCS. So which RCS is relevant here? The obvious answer is: the subject’s 
own internal clock. This, as we saw above, guarantees the causal connection between 
belief and truth-maker. However, all judgements of relative duration will come out true 
on this answer, since it is trivial that the deliverances of any RCS are true relative to that 
same RCS. So we could no longer make the distinction we would want to make 
between those judgements that are accurate and those that are not. If, instead, we chose 
some other RCS as the standard, then we can distinguish between accurate and 
inaccurate judgements, since not all deliverances of the biological clock will coincide 
with those of the other RCS. The price of this manoeuvre, however, is that, except in 
cases of a special kinds, there is no causal connection between the judgement of relative 
duration and the RCS against which we are assessing the accuracy of the judgement. 
The exceptions here are provided by certain experimental conditions, such as the 
following intriguing case concerning instrumental conditioning in rats: 
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In the standard free-operant procedure, shocks are delivered, in the absence of responding, at 
fixed intervals...and each response postpones the next shock for a fixed period of time (the 
response-shock or R-S interval). There is thus considerable regularity to the distribution of 
shocks in time, and it is not surprising that this regularity should at least sometimes be 
reflected in the subject’s behaviour. Although shock can be completely avoided by a rapid 
and sustained pattern of responding, a slower rate of responding may, if the timing is right, 
be equally effective. As training continues, some animals learn to avoid an ever-increasing 
proportion of shocks while emitting fewer and fewer responses, by timing the interval 
between successive responses to something shorter than the R-S interval…… 
 How is such behaviour to be explained? The obvious point to note is that the probability 
of responding over time maps the probability of shock. As exposure to the temporal 
regularities increases, so the subject comes to respond only at those times when the expected 
probability of shock is high. In the absence of any explicit stimuli, the passage of time since 
the last response can serve as a signal for the occurrence of the next shock, and also therefore 
as a signal that another response will cause the omission of this otherwise expected shock.  
  (Mackintosh, (1983), p. 169.) 
 
Here an RCS is part of the experimental set-up, and is used to govern the time between 
certain stimuli. The RCS in question will then both cause, and define the accuracy of, 
the subjects’ judgements. Thus truth-maker and cause will coincide. In other cases, the 
choice of RCS will be arbitrary. But is this a problem? After all, for the conventionalist, 
there is no objective fact of the matter as to whether s1 is shorter than s2 or not, so the 
subject is not tracking anything. A biological clock is simply a regulatory system, not a 
means of access to the objective properties of things.  
 However, if we ask for an explanation of our duration judgements, none is 
forthcoming on the conventionalist view of metric. Or rather what explanation there is, 
in terms of psychological mechanisms, seems incomplete. Putting this in the context of 
the scalar timing model, we might ask: given that we form a given belief on the relative 
duration of two stimuli on the basis of the numbers of pulses stored in the accumulator, 
what is it that explains the fact that just this number of pulses were collected by the 
accumulator? The conventionalist has no answer to give. We can push the demand for 
explanation further and ask why, if duration judgements are only trivially true or 
contentless, they are so useful. And even in the experimental case described above, 
where one might explain the rats’ behaviour by saying that they are tracking the outputs 
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of some timing device, their success in doing so is mysterious unless one adds that the 
device in question marks out objectively isochronic intervals. 
 To sum up the discussion of this section, it initially appeared that that treating 
time order and duration as mind-dependent offered a way out of our puzzle. If we could 
locate the truth-makers of our beliefs in the psychological processes leading up to those 
beliefs, then cause and truth-maker would coincide. This strategy, if successful, would 
support Augustine’s contention that the mystery of our ability to perceive time is best 
answered by taking time to be in the mind. However, this strategy appears to lead to an 
unacceptable subjectivism concerning our judgements⎯unacceptable not only because 
it is part of our intuitive conception of time that our judgements have objective truth-
conditions (at least in the case of order), but also because the instrumental value of 
those judgements would be entirely mysterious. 
 So we must now ask whether we are obliged to take order and metric as mind-
dependent in order to solve our puzzle. Is there still room for a view that takes these 
aspects as mind-independent? 
 
 
5 SECOND ATTEMPT: ORDER AND METRIC AS MIND-INDEPENDENT 
 
5.1 Chronometric explanation 
 
In this section, we shall look at a second strategy for resolving the puzzle, one that 
involves modifying the CTMP. Instead of confining the explanatory relationship 
between perceptual beliefs and their truth-makers to one that is purely causal, we might 
expand it to include other, non-causal, components of explanation. The modified CTMP 
becomes: 
 
The Explanatory Truth-Maker Principle (ETMP): Perceptual beliefs that qualify 
for the title of ‘knowledge’ have truth-makers that figure in a full explanation of 
the acquisition of those beliefs. 
 
A full explanation of perceptual beliefs will of course include a causal component. But 
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what other kind of explanation might be relevant? In the case of perceptual beliefs about 
time order and duration, I propose that the relevant kind of explanation is one that is 
often assimilated to causal explanation, but should be distinguished from it, a kind I 
shall dub chronometric explanation. Chronometric explanation appeals to the temporal 
location and extent of things, or to the rate of change.12 Often it will occur in the context 
of a causal explanation. Thus, a certain effect may be explained, not simply by the 
existence of an antecedent cause, but by the location of that cause in time, or by the 
interval between that cause and another item, or by the rate at which some antecedent 
change proceeded. Here are some examples of causal explanations that include 
chronometric explanations: 
 
(a) Why did the firework explode at t? 
 Because it was lit five seconds before t. 
(b) Why did electricity flow around the system? 
  Because the two buttons were pressed simultaneously, thus closing the circuit. 
(c) Why are the two traces on the Campbell-Stokes recorder the same length? 
Because the two intervals of sunshine that caused the traces were equal in 
duration. 
 
Why should we need to distinguish between purely causal and chronometric 
explanation? Because, once again, of the difficulties raised in §2.2. The kinds of fact or 
property appealed to in chronometric explanation do not appear to be causal.  
 Appeals to the rate at which processes take place are also chronometric. This 
may seem rather surprising. It implies that we do not, strictly speaking, cause changes 
in the rate of processes, and also (since the effects of some things are also causes of 
others) that such changes in rate cannot themselves be the causes of things. We need to 
be careful how we articulate this point, however. The suggestion is not that changes in 
rate cannot feature in causal explanations, either as explanans or explanandum, but 
rather that such explanations must involve a non-causal element. Here are two 
problematic cases: 
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(d) Why did the reaction speed up? 
Because a catalyst was added. 
(e) Why did the ball slow down? 
Because a force was exerted on it. 
 
In both these cases, the explanandum involves facts about intervals. Yet the explanans 
appears to be purely causal, or at least it seems to involve an event or state that can be 
given a specific location. What I suggest is happening in these cases is this. It is a brute 
fact that a given process proceeds at a certain rate. Different processes may proceed at 
different rates. When some factor appears to be affecting the rate of a process, what it is 
in fact doing is determining which of a range of related processes is realised. A reaction 
in the presence of a catalyst is not the same reaction as one in the absence of a catalyst. 
(A catalyst is sometimes described informally as something which may affect the rate of 
a reaction without itself being directly involved, but theories of catalysis, whether 
chemical or physical, all ascribe a much more active role to the catalyst.) So what we 
have here is two factors: the purely causal fact that the catalyst causes a reaction of a 
certain type to take place, and the purely chronometric fact that that reaction takes place 
at a certain rate. Similar remarks apply to the case of motion. 
 So, having introduced the notion of chronometric explanation, we can now look 
at the role it plays in the explanation of how we acquire beliefs about order and 
duration. 
 
 
5.2 How time order can be explanatory 
 
Suppose you are waiting at the traffic lights, which are currently on red. You now see 
the amber light appear, followed shortly by the green light. Consider the causal account 
of your perceptual awareness of the order: you see the amber light, the content of which 
experience is then stored in the short-term memory, which then affects your perception 
of the green light. The causal order of our perceptions determines your belief 
concerning the time order of the events perceived. Within this psychological account are 
two explanations. One is purely causal: the amber light (a) causes your perception of it 
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(Pa); the green light (g) causes your perception of it (Pg), and that second perception is 
causally affected by Pa. These causal relations, however, are not enough by themselves 
to guarantee the truth of your belief that a precedes g. So, how does the truth-maker of 
your belief⎯that a is actually earlier than g⎯play any explanatory role in your 
acquisition of that belief? 
First, we need to appeal to the following chronometric explanation: because of 
the high speed of light and the short distance between you and the events perceived, Pa 
and Pg are almost simultaneous with a and g respectively. In contrast, a and g are not 
even approximately simultaneous. These relations are set out in Fig. 2.  
 
Appearance of 
amber light  non-simultaneous with 
Appearance of 
green light 
(almost) 
simultaneous 
with 
(almost) 
simultaneous with 
Perception of 
amber light causally affects 
Perception of 
green light 
Belief that 
amber 
preceded 
green 
 
Fig. 2: Causal and chronometric elements in the acquisition of belief  
about time order 
 
 
Now, there are two ways in which we might articulate the explanatory 
connection between truth-maker and belief.  
The first way is this: the objective order of the external events, a and g, is what, 
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in part, explains how (Pa) can causally affect (Pg). Because the perceptions are virtually 
simultaneous with the events of which they are the perceptions, the order of perceptions 
will mirror the order of events, which is what enables (Pa) causally to affect (Pg) rather 
than the other way around, which in turn explains why you perceive g as following a. 
Thus, the truth-maker enters, in a rather simple and obvious way, into the explanation of 
how you come to acquire your belief. 
The second explanation is a little more interesting. Instead of explaining the 
causal order of your perceptions in terms of the time order of the external events, we 
could reverse the direction of causation. This involves an appeal to the causal theory of 
time order, of which the following is one of the simpler forms: 
 
x is earlier than y iff x is simultaneous with some fact that is a cause of some other 
fact that is simultaneous with y13 
 
The non-simultaneity of a and g explains how there can be a causal connection between 
(Pa) and (Pg), but does not determine its direction. It is the fact that (Pa) causally affects 
(Pg) and not vice versa that fixes the time order of (Pa) and (Pg), and therefore, a and g 
themselves. For since a is (virtually)14 simultaneous with a cause, (Pa), of something, 
(Pg), that is (virtually) simultaneous with g, it follows by the causal theory of time order 
that a is earlier than g. So this time the truth-maker falls out as a logical consequence of 
the explanation of the acquisition of your belief. 
 I favour the second of these explanations, because of its greater economy (the 
temporal relation is reduced to the causal relation) but, given the controversial nature of 
the causal theory of time order,15 all I can do here is simply to display the two 
explanations as illustrations of how objective and mind-independent time order can be 
genuinely explanatory of the beliefs it makes true.  
 
5.3 How duration can be explanatory 
 
Employing chronometric explanation (at least of the kind that involves reference to 
duration or rate, as opposed to just simultaneity) clearly implies a commitment to 
objectivism about metric. That is, chronometric explanation presupposes that there is a 
29 
 
 
 
 
 
fact of the matter as to whether, e.g., one interval is longer or shorter than, or equivalent 
to, some other interval, even in cases where one interval is not contained within the 
other. Assuming the legitimacy of this kind of (I submit, non-causal) explanation, we 
would expect it to be relevant in explaining our perceptual beliefs about metric. 
 So, let us say that I am presented with two successive auditory stimuli and asked 
to judge whether or not they were of equal duration. Suppose that I correctly judge that 
they are isochronous. According to the scalar timing theory, the onset of the first 
stimulus closes the switch between pacemaker and accumulator, which then encodes the 
number of pulses emitted by the pacemaker. Stimulus offset causes the switch to open. 
The encoded pulses now provide a measurement of the length of the first stimulus, 
which is stored in the short-term memory. The same process is activated by the second 
stimulus. The resulting two measurements are then compared, and a judgement of 
isochrony arrived at. Again, the purely causal facts are not sufficient for the truth of my 
belief. What more is needed is the chronometric explanation of why just these pulses 
were recorded by the accumulator. The chronometric explanation will appeal to the 
objective lengths of the intervals between stimulus onset and offset. These lengths then 
entail the truth about the isochrony of the stimuli. So, once again, the facts that provide 
a full explanation of how I come to acquire my belief that the two stimuli are 
isochronous include the truth-maker of that belief, and the Explanatory Truth-Maker 
Principle is satisfied. 
 
 
5.4 A compromise: A-series position as mind-dependent 
 
Objective, mind-independent facts about time order and metric can be genuinely 
explanatory of our perceptual beliefs. But not all aspects of time may have an 
explanatory role to play. So there may be room for compromise with the Augustinian 
position: perhaps some features of time are best understood as mind-dependent. Or so I 
shall argue in this section. The aspect I shall focus on is that of A-series position. 
 The term ‘A-series’ was first introduced by J.E. McTaggart, in his well-known 
distinction between two kinds of temporal ordering, which was the prelude to his 
notorious proof of the unreality of time ((1908), (1927)). The A-series, then, is the series 
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of positions in time which runs from the distant past, through the present, and to the 
distant future. The A-series position of an event is therefore its pastness, presentness or 
futurity. We might augment this and say that pastness and futurity is a matter of degree: 
something can be very recently past, or very distantly past, and so on. It is a 
characteristic of the A-series positions of events that they change, and this, which is 
nothing less than the passage of time itself, is an obvious and apparently entirely 
objective aspect of time, one that seems necessary for us to have any experience at all. 
McTaggart contrasted this with the B-series, which orders events according to the 
relations they stand in to other events⎯more specifically, according to their 
simultaneity or precedence relations. B-series positions do not change. If a is at any 
time earlier than b, it is so for all time. It is B-series relations and properties that we 
have been concerned with for most of this paper. However if, as we naturally assume, 
there is such a thing as A-series position, it is clearly logically connected to B-series 
position. If Sally’s birth is past, but Jilly’s birth is present, then, inexorably, Sally’s 
birth precedes Jilly’s. Given this logical connection, we need to decide which is the 
more fundamental: A-series position, or B-series position. Suppose that A-series facts 
are the more fundamental, and order facts supervene upon them. We might propose a 
reductive analysis along the following lines: 
 
 a is earlier than b  
iff: 
 a is less future than b  
or 
 a is present and b is future  
or 
a is past and b is present  
or 
a is more past than b  
 
This is just one of a number of reductive analyses we could have proposed16, and one 
might regard some aspects of this particular one with suspicion: is the ‘less future than’ 
relation, for example, just a combination of two elements, namely the A-series ‘futurity’ 
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position and the B-series ‘earlier than’ relation, and if so, does this not make the 
analysis circular? We do not need to engage with these and other worries concerning the 
precise terms of the analysis. The point to note is simply this: that if the B-series 
supervenes on the A-series, then a’s being earlier than b will supervene on changing 
properties, since change is the characteristic feature of A-series position. On the above 
analysis, for instance, the passage of time will run from the first disjunct on the list to 
the last. 
Let us suppose, then, that the B-series does supervene upon the A-series. Then 
the truth-makers of our beliefs about the order of two events (such as the appearance of 
the amber and green lights) will be the A-series positions, or facts about the A-series 
positions, of those events. The Explanatory Truth-Maker principle then requires that 
these truth-makers should also play an explanatory role in our acquisition of those 
beliefs (where the beliefs count as knowledge). But can A-series positions play such an 
explanatory role?  
The problem here is that the supposed truth-makers of our order beliefs are 
constantly changing. At one time, our beliefs have one truth-maker (represented by one 
of the disjuncts in our truth-conditional schema above, or in some similar schema), at 
another, those same beliefs have a different truth-maker. What makes true your present 
belief that a preceded g is the current A-series positions of a and g. What made true that 
same belief a few seconds ago was their A-series positions then. But whatever it is that 
explains our belief-acquisition cannot be changing in this way. The explanation lies in 
whatever states of affairs obtained when I first acquired the beliefs, not what states of 
affairs obtain now, some time afterwards. If we describe the situation, as we did §5.2, in 
purely B-series terms, then the problem does not arise: explanation and truth-maker 
coincide.17 It seems, then, that A-series positions are entirely de trop in explaining how 
we come to acquire beliefs about time order. 
 According to one theory of time, the B- theory, such positions are indeed de 
trop, and we can dispense with them entirely. A-series position, on this theory, is simply 
a feature of our representations of reality, not of reality itself. Statements attributing A-
series position to events or states of affairs (‘Matthew’s birthday party is tomorrow’) 
can be true, but only in virtue of non-tensed temporal relations between the statements 
themselves and the events of which they speak (e.g. Matthew’s party being one day 
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after the day the statement is made). One could express this by saying that, for the B-
theorist, A-series position is mind-dependent. If we can explain our acquisition of 
beliefs about order without recourse to the A-series, the ETMP gives us reason to 
suppose that order does not depend on A-series position at all. But since order would 
supervene on A-series position, if the A-series existed independently of any mind (for 
otherwise the logical connections between A-series and B-series position would be 
inexplicable), we have grounds here for supposing that A-series position is mind-
dependent. Thus, we could agree with part of Augustine’s conclusion: the A-series, at 
least, is in the mind.18 
 
 
6 SUMMARY CONCLUSION 
 
Psychologists have long recognized that time perception is not directly analogous to 
perception of objects and their properties, for the temporal features of events do not 
present themselves for inspection in the way that spatial properties do. Yet perception 
does inform of such things as the time order and duration of events: how? This 
psychological problem has a philosophical counterpart: if perceptual knowledge is 
definable in terms of perceptual beliefs whose truth-maker and cause coincide, how is it 
possible to have perceptual knowledge of time? For a number of considerations⎯the 
problematic nature of time perception, the difficulty of locating temporal properties in 
space and time, the fact that models of time perception do not include them as 
explanatory factors⎯point to the conclusion that time order and duration are acausal 
properties of events. This is the epistemological puzzle of time perception, and the 
central aim of this paper was to solve it. 
 That the causal theory of knowledge, prima facie, runs into difficulties in 
accounting for certain objects of knowledge is a familiar problem. The most-discussed 
examples are numbers, as the arithmetical Platonist conceives of them, and moral truths, 
as the realist conceives of them.19 Problems arise in these cases because of the abstract 
status of such objects. It would, surely, be surprising if difficulties should also arise in a 
case of perceptual knowledge. But time seems to provide such a case. 
 One approach to the problem was to see it as arising from the assumption that 
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order and duration are mind-independent properties. If instead we look for the truth-
makers of our perceptual beliefs about order and duration within the psychological 
mechanisms underlying our acquisition of those beliefs, that might restore their causal 
status. Such a strategy, if successful, would vindicate Augustine’s view that, since it is 
within my mind that I measure time, time is mind-dependent. However, this leads to an 
implausible subjectivism concerning our beliefs, and no adequate means of explaining 
either their usefulness or how we acquired them at all. 
 A better approach is to modify the causal truth-maker principle. Instead of 
making causal relations between truth-maker and belief bear alone the burden of 
conferring the status of knowledge, we should require instead that the truth-makers play 
some form of explanatory role in the acquisition of perceptual knowledge. Explanation, 
even of a non-logical kind, is not invariably purely causal. And even in what might 
ordinarily be called causal explanation, there are non-causal components. Within such 
explanation, beside references to the causes themselves, there may also be reference to 
the properties and relations that structure those causes: their location in space and time, 
for example. It is a question worth pursuing whether a theory of knowledge based on 
this more inclusive conception of explanation could more easily accommodate 
knowledge of abstract objects. In the context of time perception, appeal to what I called 
chronometric explanation helps us solve the epistemological puzzle while retaining our 
belief in the mind-independence of order and duration. 
 Is there no comfort for Augustine, then? Well, maybe. One property, at least, is 
best treated as mind-dependent: A-series position. And given that Augustine habitually 
talks of time in terms of pastness, presentness and futurity, this is perhaps what he was 
saying all along.20 
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NOTES 
 
[1] See Ayer (1940) for a classic statement of the ‘argument from illusion’. For a more 
recent defence of the sense-datum theory, see Jackson (1977). 
 
[2] This was an address given in 1973 to a meeting of the International Society for the 
Study of Time in Japan. The paper’s title is quoted by Pöppel (1978), who also quotes 
the following remark: ‘time is not a thing that, like an apple, may be perceived.’ The 
source for the remark is Woodrow (1951). 
 
[3] In James’s words, ‘We are constantly aware of a certain duration⎯the specious 
present⎯varying from a few seconds to probably not more than a minute, and this 
duration (with its content perceived as having one part earlier and another part later) is 
the original intuition of time.’ (James (1890)) However, the extraordinary temporal 
range of James’s specious present, and its phenomenological divisibility into earlier and 
later parts, makes it a very different thing from what could be called the present of 
experience, namely what presents itself as happening now. This, much shorter, and 
phenomenologically indivisible, specious present, has a duration of something like a 
tenth of a second, although this varies from one sense modality to another, and perhaps 
from one time and subject to another. It is this second conception of the specious 
present, not James’s original conception, with which I am concerned. 
 
[4] It is only fair to point out, in relation to the second part of this quotation, that 
Ornstein was writing over thirty years ago, since when there has been a considerable 
amount of research on time perception. And, even at the time, it might been considered 
a less than generous remark. See, e.g., Pöppel (1978) and Friedman (1990).  
The second part of the first sentence in this quotation is rather puzzling. I am 
inclined to think that when Ornstein says ‘outside ourselves’ he means ‘within 
ourselves’, and that his point is that there is no obvious sense organ for time. The 
sentence, however, is not corrected in later editions. 
 
[5] See Grice (1961) for a cautious defence of the causal theory of perception, and 
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Goldman (1967) for an early statement of the causal theory of knowledge. Goldman 
later abandoned the causal requirement (Goldman (1976)). Another version of the 
causal theory is presented and defended in Swain (1979). 
 ‘Truth-maker’ is a philosophers’ term of art. It is intended to refer to whatever 
aspect of reality is responsible for the truth of an assertion, belief or proposition. I 
advance no views here about what kinds of entity⎯objects, events, properties, 
facts⎯are suited to play the role of truth-maker, since the argument does not require me 
to, although the issue is briefly touched upon in §2. 
 
[6] This kind of problem is discussed in Goldman (1976), leading to a version of the 
reliabilist account of knowledge. 
 
[7] See, e.g., Strawson (1974) and Peacocke (1979) for discussion of deviant causal 
chains. 
 
[8] There is, in fact, something of a philosophical tradition that space and time are 
themselves acausal. For references and discussion, see Le Poidevin (1992). 
 
[9] Here ‘fact’ is being used to mean a particular kind of constituent of the world, 
existing independently of language or thought, and not in the sense of true proposition. 
The argument for the truth-making role’s being occupied by facts, and not by 
particulars, properties or relations, is well-known and simply stated. You say to me 
‘Eric has crashed the party’. What makes this true? Not Eric, for his existence is 
perfectly compatible with the falsehood of your remark. Nor any intrinsic property of 
Eric’s, for first this property needs to be attached to Eric in some way, and second, none 
of his intrinsic properties could constitute the property of crashing a party. Some 
relation between Eric, a spatial location and perhaps other particulars, then? No, 
because the relation by itself cannot make your remark true independently of the relata, 
since your remark was specifically about Eric. But then a mere collection consisting of 
Eric, his intrinsic properties, other particulars, and the relations between all these cannot 
make your remark true either: they have to combined in some way. That is, your remark 
can only be made true by some structured combination of particulars, properties and 
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relations, and this structured combination all folk (well, some folk) call a fact. One 
might resist  this by introducing events as truth-makers. In this case, the event of Eric’s 
crashing the party. But there are many truths for which events are clearly ill-suited to be 
the truth-makers. Suppose you had said ‘Eric hasn’t crashed the party’? What event 
could possibly make this true? Here, perhaps, one could say that the remark has no 
truth-maker, but is true simply in virtue of the absence of a truth-maker for its negation, 
namely, ‘Eric has crashed the party’. But this strategy only works, if at all, for negative 
statements. Some statements appear to ascribe properties to events: ‘Eric’s crashing the 
party last night was so embarrassing’. The event of Eric’s crashing the party is certainly 
not sufficient by itself to make that statement true, for the statement is to do with the 
effect of his behaviour on me. If the event appears in the truth-maker at all, it is only as 
part of some structured combination⎯a fact, in other words. At any rate, so it can 
plausibly be argued. I need take no view on the matter here. 
 
[10] For a summary and discussion of the evidence for backwards time referral, see 
Libet (1981). One rather striking case he reported was as follows. Tingling sensations in 
the hand can be produced in two ways: by electrical stimulation of the hand itself, or of 
the appropriate part of the somatosensory cortext. The latter, in effect, mimics the later 
stages of the neural events associated with hand stimulation, and so, one might expect, 
should lead more quickly to the perceived sensation. In one experiment, the subject’s 
left cortext was stimulated before the left hand was stimulated. The former led to a 
sensation in the right hand, but this was reported as occurring after the sensation in the 
left hand. 
 For a discussion of this, and other intriguing cases, including the ‘cutaneous 
rabbit’ and the ‘precognitive carousel’, see Chapter 12 of Dennett (1991), which also 
presents a content-sensitivity model of order perception. 
 
[11] Since he thinks there is a particular problem in the case of time, it is likely that 
Augustine was assuming ordinary perception to be simultaneous with its objects. 
However, the finite speeds of light and sound mean that there is always a gap, however 
small, between any given state of affairs and our perception of it. Reflection on this 
(now familiar) fact would, on the basis of his reasoning in the temporal case, have led 
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Augustine to a comprehensive idealism. 
 
[12] C.f. Graham Nerlich’s introduction of ‘geometrical explanation’, which is a non-
causal explanation of the behaviour of moving objects in terms of the geometrical 
properties of space (Nerlich (1994). 
 
[13] Since simultaneity is reflexive, the analysis defines the order of events that are 
themselves the causal relata. 
 
[14] Of course, on the causal analysis, an event cannot be exactly simultaneous with the 
perception that it causes. 
 
[15] The following difficulty arises for the version of the causal analysis presented here. 
Suppose a to be a cause of b, and c a cause of d. There are no causal connections 
between the a-b pair on the one hand and the c-d pair on the other. a is simultaneous 
with d, and b is simultaneous with c. It would follow, from the causal analysis, both that 
a is earlier than b (because simultaneous with a cause of something that is simultaneous 
with b) and that b is earlier than a (because simultaneous with a cause of something that 
is simultaneous with a). We could simply accept this consequence, but deny that it 
constitutes a contradiction, on the grounds that time order is merely local to a causally 
isolated system. Time order may run in opposite directions in different parts of the 
universe. This does not entirely dispose of the problem, however, because we cannot 
rule out the possibility that such regions will come into contact. What is to prevent the 
following situation: a is a cause of b, b is a cause of c, and c is simultaneous with a? 
One, not obviously question-begging, way of outlawing this kind of case is to introduce 
the following principle: where, for any causally related items, x, y and z, y is causally 
between x and z, it is also temporally between those items. The various difficulties for 
causal analyses of time order, and possible responses to them, are discussed in Le 
Poidevin (2003), Chapter 12. 
 
[16] For a survey of the various options, and their shortcomings, see Tooley (1997), 
Chapter 6. 
38 
 
 
 
 
 
 
[17] See Le Poidevin (1999) for further discussion of this. 
 
[18] See Mellor (1998) for a defence of (one version of) the B-theory of time. Moore 
(2001) explores the variety of issues at stake in debates between B-theorists and 
defenders of the A-series. 
 
[19] This is one way of articulating the ‘argument from queerness’ against objective 
moral properties, on which see Mackie (1977), Chapter 1. On the problem as it arises 
for numbers and similar abstract objects, see Hale (1987), Chapter 4. 
 
[20] I gratefully acknowledge help and support during the writing of this paper from the 
following: the Arts and Humanities Research Board, for financial support that provided 
relief from teaching and administration; my department, for granting me study leave; 
audiences at Leeds, Lampeter and Glasgow, and especially Joseph Melia, Philip 
Percival, David Cockburn, Bernhard Weiss, John Divers, and Bob Hale, for reactions to 
much earlier versions of this paper; the Royal Institute of Philosophy, under whose 
auspices the Glasgow lecture was given; and two anonymous referees for Synthese, 
whose constructive comments greatly assisted me in preparing the final version. 
 
39 
 
 
 
 
 
REFERENCES 
 
Augustine, St. (397) Confessions, trans. R.S. Pinecoffin, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 
1961 
 
Ayer, A.J. (1940) The Foundations of Empirical Knowledge, London: Macmillan 
 
Binkofski, F. and Block, R.A. (1996) ‘Accelerated Time after Left Frontal Cortex 
Lesion’, Neurocase, Vol. 2, pp. 485-93 
 
Block, Richard and Zakay, Dan (2001) ‘Retrospective and Prospective Timing: 
Memory, Attention, and Consciousness, in Hoerl and McCormack (2001), pp. 59-76 
 
Church, R.M. and Broadbent, H. (1990) ‘Alternative Representations of Time, Number, 
and Rate’, Cognition 37, pp. 55-81 
 
Davidson, Donald (1967) ‘Causal Relations’, in Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, pp. 149-62 
 
Dennett, Daniel (1991) Consciousness Explained, London: Allen Lane 
 
Friedman, William J (1990) About Time: Inventing the Fourth Dimension, Cambridge, 
Mass.: MIT Press 
 
Gibbon, J., Church, R.M., and Meck, W. (1984) ‘Scalar Timing in Memory’, in J. 
Gibbon and L. Allan (ed.) Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences, Vol. 432: 
Timing and Time Perception, New York: New York Academy of Sciences 
 
Goldman, Alvin (1967) ‘A Causal Theory of Knowing’, Journal of Philosophy Vol. 64, 
pp. 357-72 
 
⎯ (1976) ‘Discrimination and Perceptual Knowledge’, Journal of Philosophy 73, pp. 
40 
 
 
 
 
 
771-91 
 
Grice, H.P. (1961) ‘The Causal Theory of Perception’, Aristotelian Society 
Supplementary Volume 35, pp. 121-52 
 
Hale, Bob (1987) Abstract Objects, Oxford: Basil Blackwell 
 
Hirsh, I.J. and Sherrick, J.E. (1961) ‘Perceived Order in Different Sense Modalities’, 
Journal of Experimental Psychology 62, 423-32 
 
Hoerl, Christoph and McCormack, Teresa (2001) eds., Time and Memory: Issues in 
Philosophy and Psychology, Oxford: Clarendon Press  
 
Jackson, Frank (1977) Perception, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
 
James, William (1890) The Principles of Psychology, New York: Henry Holt 
 
Le Poidevin, Robin (1992) ‘On the Acausality of Time, Space, and Space-Time’, 
Analysis 52, pp. 146-54 
 
⎯ (1999) ‘Can Beliefs Be Caused By Their Truth-Makers?’, Analysis 59, pp. 148-
56 
 
⎯ (2003) Travels in Four Dimensions: The Enigmas of Space and Time, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press 
 
Libet, Benjamin (1981) ‘The Experimental Evidence for Subjective Referral of a 
Sensory Experience Backwards in Time: Reply to P.S. Churchland’, Philosophy of 
Science 48, pp. 182-97 
 
Mackie, J.L. (1977) Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong, Harmondsworth: Penguin 
 
41 
 
 
 
 
 
Mackintosh, N.J. (1983) Conditioning and Associative Learning, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press 
 
McTaggart, J.E. (1908) ‘The Unreality of Time’, Mind 17, pp. 457-74 
 
 ⎯ (1927) The Nature of Existence, Volume II, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press; part of Chapter 33 reprinted under the title ‘The Unreality of Time’, in Robin 
Le Poidevin and Murray MacBeath (eds.) The Philosophy of Time, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1993, pp. 23-34 
 
Mellor, D.H. (1995) The Facts of Causation, London: Routledge 
 
 ⎯ (1998) Real Time II, London: Routledge 
 
Moore (2001) ‘Apperception and the Unreality of Tense’, in Hoerl and McCormack 
(2001), pp. 375-91 
 
Newton-Smith, W.H. (1980) The Structure of Time, London: Routledge 
 
Nerlich, Graham (1994) What Spacetime Explains, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press 
 
Ornstein, Robert, (1972) The Psychology of Consciousness, Harmondsworth: Penguin 
 
Peacocke, Christopher (1979) Holistic Explanation: Action, Space, Interpretation, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press 
 
Pöppel, Ernst (1978) ‘Time Perception’, in Richard Held et al., eds., Handbook of 
Sensory Physiology, Vol. VIII: Perception, Berlin: Springer-Verlag, pp. 713-29 
 
Reichenbach, Hans (1958) The Philosophy of Space and Time, London: Dover 
 
42 
 
 
 
 
 
Russell, Bertrand (1912) The Problems of Philosophy, OPUS edition, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1959 
 
Strawson, P.F. (1974) ‘Causation in Perception’, in Freedom and Resentment and Other 
Essays, London: Methuen 
 
Swain, Marshall (1979) Reasons and Knowledge, Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press 
 
Tooley, Michael (1997) Time, Tense, and Causation, Oxford: Clarendon Press 
 
Treisman, Michel (1999) ‘The Perception of Time: Philosophical Views and 
Psychological Evidence’, in Jeremy Butterfield (ed.) The Arguments of Time, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 217-46 
 
Wearden, J.H. (2001) ‘Internal Clocks and the Representation of Time’, in Hoerl and 
McCormack (2001), pp. 37-58 
 
Woodrow, H. (1951) ‘Time Perception’, in S.S. Stevens (ed.) Handbook of 
Experimental Psychology, New York: John Wiley & Sons, pp. 1224-36 
 
 
School of Philosophy 
The University of Leeds 
Leeds LS2 9JT 
England 
E-mail: r.d.lepoidevin@leeds.ac.uk 
 
 
 
 
 
43 
 
 
